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Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
=========================

This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
CVE-2022-39260.

Fixes since v2.30.5
-------------------

 * CVE-2022-39253:
   When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
   symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
   (or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
   This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
   present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
   repository.

   Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
   clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
   have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.

   Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
   "user" by default.

 * CVE-2022-39260:
   An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
   overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
   remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
   `$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.

   `git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
   longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
   inputs larger than 2GiB.

Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.

Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.


Jeff King (2):
      shell: add basic tests
      shell: limit size of interactive commands

Kevin Backhouse (1):
      alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()

Taylor Blau (11):
      builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
      t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
      t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
      t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
      t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
      t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
      t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
      t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
      t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
      t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
      transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default